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Abstract
Humans can exploit recognition memory as a simple cue for judgment. The utility of recognition depends on the interplay 
with the environment, particularly on its predictive power (validity) in a domain. It is, therefore, an important question 
whether people are sensitive to differences in recognition validity between domains. Strategic, intra-individual changes in 
the reliance on recognition have not been investigated so far. The present study fills this gap by scrutinizing within-person 
changes in using a frugal strategy, the recognition heuristic (RH), across two task domains that differed in recognition validity. 
The results showed adaptive changes in the reliance on recognition between domains. However, these changes were neither 
associated with the individual recognition validities nor with corresponding changes in these validities. These findings sup-
port a domain-adaptivity explanation, suggesting that people have broader intuitions about the usefulness of recognition 
across different domains that are nonetheless sufficiently robust for adaptive decision making. The analysis of metacognitive 
confidence reports mirrored and extended these results. Like RH use, confidence ratings covaried with task domain, but 
not with individual recognition validities. The changes in confidence suggest that people may have metacognitive access to 
information about global differences between task domains, but not to individual cue validities.
Introduction
Organisms have to make predictions and inferences in an 
inherently uncertain world. An influential perspective on 
judgment and decision making suggests that humans achieve 
this by relying on available cues (pieces of information) that 
are only probabilistically related to some criterion in the 
environment (Brunswik, 1952). For instance, physicians 
consider specific symptoms to make their diagnoses, judges 
decide whether to release a defendant on bail based on the 
past records (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004), and con-
sumers might infer the quality of products based on the price 
or by recognizing their brand names (Rao & Monroe, 1989). 
Importantly, such cues are not universally useful across dif-
ferent domains of decision making. In this article, we focus 
on the individual ability to use recognition memory adap-
tively as a cue across different situations.
Recognition memory (i.e., the ability to discriminate 
between familiar and novel items) provides a particularly 
simple cue for inference that is retrieved rapidly and with lit-
tle effort (e.g., Rosburg, Mecklinger, & Frings, 2011). Gold-
stein and Gigerenzer (2002) found that people frequently 
Elisa Filevich and Sebastian Horn contributed equally to this 
article.
We thank Vahik Soghom and Ksenia Appelganc for help with data 
collection and for valuable comments.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this 
article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-017-0962-7) contains 
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
 * Elisa Filevich 
 filevich@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
1 Center for Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute 
for Human Development, Lentzeallee 94, 14195 Berlin, 
Germany
2 Department of Psychology, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 
Berlin, Germany
3 Bernstein Center for Computational Neuroscience, Berlin, 
Germany
4 Berlin School for Mind and Brain, Berlin, Germany
5 Center for Adaptive Rationality (ARC), Max Planck Institute 
for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
6 Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Zurich, 
Switzerland
7 Klinik und Poliklinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, 




utilize recognition for their judgments and specified a 
model—the recognition heuristic (RH)—that explains peo-
ple’s strategic inferences when two items must be ordered 
along a quantitative criterion (e.g., inferring which of two 
cities is more populous). According to the RH, if one item is 
recognized (e.g., Prague) and the other is not (e.g., Erdenet), 
then the recognized item is inferred to have the higher value 
on the criterion dimension (on which the objects’ true values 
are unknown). The RH has been extensively investigated 
(e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Hilbig, Michalkiewicz, 
Castela, Pohl, & Erdfelder, 2015; Kämmer, Gaissmaier, 
Reimer, & Schermuly, 2014; McCloy, Beaman, Frosch, & 
Goddard, 2010; Newell & Shanks, 2004; Pachur, Bröder, & 
Marewski, 2008) and is a prime example of a frugal heuris-
tic that exploits one good reason (recognition) that leads to 
surprisingly accurate judgments in many real-world domains 
because familiar and novel items often differ systematically 
on relevant dimensions such as quantity or success (e.g., 
sports teams, brands, stocks, and colleges that are recog-
nized tend to be more successful). Even though people may 
not always give recognition primacy over other information 
in strict non-compensatory fashion, as originally specified 
for the RH (Glöckner, Hilbig, Jekel, 2014; Hilbig et al. 2015; 
Newell & Shanks, 2004), research on how recognition is 
systematically exploited as a cue remains important (for 
overviews, see Marewski, Pohl, & Vitouch, 2010; Pachur, 
Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011).
As any other rule of thumb, the RH is not a bad or good 
strategy per se: its success depends on the interplay with the 
environment, that is, the fit to the problem at hand (Giger-
enzer & Goldstein, 2011). For a given domain or task, the 
judgment accuracy attainable with the RH can be quantified 
as recognition validity (α), which measures the strength of 
covariation between recognition memory and the criterion 
dimension.1 Whereas recognition is often a valid cue for 
inferences of properties of real-world items (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002; Pohl 2006), ecological analyses indicate 
that whenever the frequency of mentions by mediators in 
the environment (e.g., by other people, electronic media, 
newspapers, etc.) does not uniquely map onto a relevant 
criterion dimension, then the RH tends to fare poorly (see 
Pachur et al. 2011). For instance, the recognition validity α 
is relatively low for inferring the frequency of diseases in a 
country (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) or the distance of cities to 
an arbitrary geographical reference point (Pohl 2006). Fol-
lowing these considerations, a central question surrounding 
research on the RH is to what extent it is used adaptively 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur et al. 2011; Pohl 
2006; Pohl, Michalkiewicz, Erdfelder, & Hilbig, 2017). That 
is, how sensitive are people to differences in recognition 
validity and do they adaptively adjust their reliance on the 
RH accordingly?
Adaptive reliance on recognition
In a review on the RH, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) 
explored the relation between RH use and the recognition 
validity across various domains. Pooling the data from 
43 studies and domains yielded a positive linear relation 
of r = .57 between the mean frequency of judgments in 
accordance with the RH and participants’ average recogni-
tion validity. Beyond these cross-study correlations, only 
few investigations addressed this issue experimentally and 
directly compared participants’ adaptive RH use between 
task domains that differed systematically in the validity of 
recognition: Pohl (2006) found that name recognition of 
Swiss cities predicted their population (α = 0.86), but not 
their distance to a geographical reference point, the city 
Interlaken (α = 0.51). Correspondingly, participants relied 
more on recognition2 in inferences of the city populations 
(0.66) than of the distances (0.08). Similarly, Hilbig, Erd-
felder and Pohl (2010; Exp. 7) found that people relied 
more on recognition (0.65 vs. 0.20) when making infer-
ences of the population of Italian cities (α = 0.87) than of 
their height above sea level (α = 0.53). Data from Pachur, 
Mata, and Schooler (2009) also indicated that people’s reli-
ance on recognition was substantially higher (0.80 vs. 0.30) 
in a domain with high-recognition validity (inferences of 
US city populations; α = 0.90) than in a domain with low-
recognition validity (inferences of the frequency of diseases; 
α = 0.62). These findings suggest that the group averages 
of RH use closely match the mean recognition validity in a 
given domain and that recognition validity is a central factor 
explaining how frequently the RH is applied. However, it is 
still an open question whether and how single individuals 
1 The recognition validity α quantifies the predictive power of rec-
ognition and is conceptually similar to the ecological validity of a so-
called “proximal cue” in Brunswik’s (1952) lens model. For a spe-
cific domain, it is defined as α = CRU / (CRU + IRU), where CRU and 
IRU are the correct and incorrect judgments, respectively, that would 
result from always choosing the recognized item in cases where one 
of the two items in a comparative two-alternative choice task is rec-
ognized (denoted as RU cases). Defined this way, α can range from 
zero to one; if α = 1, choosing the recognized item would always lead 
to a correct judgment; if α = 0.50, choosing the recognized object 
would lead to chance-level accuracy and recognition would be uncor-
related with the criterion dimension. The recognition validity is usu-
ally calculated for each individual and the averaged validities across 
individuals then serve as measure for the recognition validity in a 
specific task or domain (Goldstein and Gigerenzer 2002).
2 The reliance on recognition as a cue for inference in this section 
is reported as probability (i.e., ranging from 0 to 1), derived from 
model-based measures (Pohl et al. 2017).
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adaptively adjust their reliance on recognition. In the litera-
ture, two different interpretations have been discussed how 
adaptive RH use may come about.
One possibility is that individuals are sensitive to the 
validity of their own recognition knowledge and use the RH 
in a proportion of trials that matches this validity (henceforth 
termed matching hypothesis; see also Pachur & Hertwig, 
2006). However, little support emerged for this notion so 
far, as correlations between RH use and α within a specific 
domain have been found to be negligible. For instance, both 
Pachur and Hertwig (2006) and Pohl (2006) observed that 
individual proportions of judgments in accordance with the 
RH were uncorrelated with the individual α within a given 
domain. Moreover, there is evidence that people’s estimates 
of the validity of their own recognition knowledge are not 
very accurate (Pachur et al. 2008). In this vein, Pohl et al. 
(2017) investigated whether use of the RH is influenced by 
the validity of the specific set of selected items or by the 
underlying domain from which these items were sampled 
(global domain validity). Importantly, their findings indi-
cated that it is the validity of the general environment (rather 
than that of specific items) that impacts strategy use, sug-
gesting that participants behave as if all items were approxi-
mately representative of an underlying domain. Hence, as an 
alternative possibility, people may notice cue-validity dif-
ferences between task domains on a more global level and 
adjust their RH use accordingly (henceforth termed environ-
ment adaptivity hypothesis); in this case, adaptive changes in 
strategy use may result from having fuzzier intuitions about 
the usefulness of a cue in a given domain rather than con-
sidering (or even computing) individual cue validities. Even 
though these intuitions may not be perfect, they could none-
theless foster adaptive decision-making and robustly cap-
ture rank differences in cue validities across tasks (Wright 
& Murphy, 1984; see Katsikopoulos, Schooler, & Hertwig, 
2010, for further discussion), as long as items are representa-
tively sampled (Pohl et al., 2017).
Taken together, the notion of adaptive selection of the 
RH (or any other strategy) implies dynamic within-person 
changes in behavior. Crucially however, the aforementioned 
hypotheses about adaptive RH use have never been tested 
within individuals, to the best of our knowledge. This is 
important for several reasons. The first reason is conceptual: 
when a theory proposes individual, adaptive change, then 
these assumptions should be put to test with data that corre-
spond as closely as possible. We, therefore, note a mismatch 
between the theoretical proposition of individual adaptivity 
and data from previous analyses, which examined variability 
between individuals. Second, and apart from usual methodo-
logical considerations (such as reductions in unsystematic 
variance through repeated testing of the same participants), 
experiments in various fields of psychology have shown 
that effects of independent variables are often different in 
within- and between-subjects designs (Erlebacher 1977). 
The generalizability across designs hinges on the assumption 
of variation equivalence (i.e., the assumption that processes 
generating variability within and between individuals are 
identical; Lindenberger & von Oertzen, 2006). Moreover, 
situations are conceivable in which mean-level changes 
are produced by only a minority of subjects (as reflected, 
e.g., in the conceptual distinction between differential and 
mean-level and stability in personality research; e.g., Josef 
et al. 2016). Finally, some aspects of strategy use can only 
be tested within participants. For example, can we observe 
some stability in the reliance on recognition (e.g., rank-
order stability), even when the validity of a cue changes 
dramatically?
In this study, we addressed these issues and set out to 
investigate adaptive use of the RH within the same decision-
makers across two task domains that strongly differed in 
their recognition validity, using a modeling approach that 
provides estimates of individual parameters as well as their 
correlations. In addition, we aimed to gain further insight 
into people’s adaptive RH use by considering their meta-
cognitive reports.
Metacognitive monitoring and use 
of recognition
Metacognitive monitoring refers to the human ability to 
introspect and report one’s own mental states (e.g., to evalu-
ate how much we know; Koriat, 2007). Confidence reports 
can be viewed as a central aspect of metacognitive monitor-
ing (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012). In this study, we con-
sidered judgment confidence as an additional measure for 
understanding adaptive strategy use and asked participants, 
after each trial, about their confidence in the correctness of 
their preceding judgment. Historically, research on the RH 
originated from investigations of subjective confidence and 
the question of when people exhibit overconfidence (Fis-
chhoff, 1982) in their judgment accuracy (Hoffrage, Hafen-
brädl, & Marewski, 2017).3 Notwithstanding these important 
considerations, we focused here on the relative change in 
confidence as a function of task environment and the rela-
tion with strategy use. We expected that people’s confidence 
should be influenced by the ecological validity of the most 
3 Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting (1991) and Hoffrage (2011) 
extensively examined confidence reports in the context of cue-based 
decision making. These researchers found that when participants 
were not asked to evaluate a single judgment but were instead asked 
how many correct answers they gave (in a frequency format) people 
appeared well-calibrated and over-confidence effects disappeared, 
which speaks against the interpretation of overconfidence reflecting a 
general and stable “bias” in human judgment.
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relevant cue in probabilistic inference problems (Gigerenzer, 
Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) and should thus change as 
function of task domain.
For the present analyses, we borrowed from research on 
signal detection the notion of metacognitive sensitivity that 
refers to the degree to which peoples’ confidence tracks 
their performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Metacognitive 
sensitivity is dissociable from accuracy in a task (e.g., the 
proportion of correct judgments) and from setting a subjec-
tive criterion (i.e., the strength of internal evidence required 
to report a certain level of confidence; for further details, 
see Fleming & Lau, 2014). First, the distinction between 
metacognitive sensitivity and task accuracy acknowledges 
the possibility that participants may commit many errors 
in a task, but are nevertheless highly sensitive to their 
performance and assign high confidence only to their few 
correct responses (and rarely to their incorrect responses). 
Second, this implies that confidence reports are a function 
of two separable components, the strength of an internal 
signal and a subjective criterion. One approach to measure 
metacognitive sensitivity is to calculate the slope parameter 
for each participant in a regression model that provides an 
estimate for the relationship between confidence and judg-
ment accuracy. Large slope estimates would indicate a strong 
relationship between the two variables and high metacogni-
tive sensitivity: Small differences in accuracy are readily 
detected in metacognitive monitoring and result in signifi-
cant differences in confidence. Conversely, slope estimates 
close to zero would indicate poor metacognitive sensitivity 
and imply that even larger differences in accuracy do not 
result in significant changes in confidence (Norman, Price 
& Jones, 2011; Sandberg et al. 2010). Modeling confidence 
in this way helps us to interpret people’s metacognitive 
reports between tasks: If participants show similar metacog-
nitive sensitivity across two experimental conditions (i.e., a 
consistent relationship between confidence and accuracy), 
then any potential differences in confidence reports can-
not be attributed to poorer metacognitive insight in one of 
the conditions. Consequently, the absolute values of confi-
dence ratings can be directly compared in such a situation. 
Differences in confidence ratings between two conditions 
would then support the conclusion that these conditions have 
different properties (e.g., different cue validities) that are 
accessible on a metacognitive level. In this study, we used 
this approach to interpret people’s confidence reports in the 
comparative judgment task.
Both the matching and the environment adaptivity 
hypotheses are silent about the relation between introspec-
tive experience and adaptivity and neither hypothesis makes 
explicit predictions about confidence ratings. We argue, 
however, that confidence reports could be used to further 
refine and test these predictions. When participants follow 
recognition as a cue, its validity could have an impact on 
subsequent confidence ratings. That is, a cue of higher valid-
ity would more frequently lead to a correct judgment than 
a less valid cue; individuals with higher recognition-cue 
validities (and metacognitive access to them) could, place 
higher confidence in judgments following recognition (and 
vice versa for individuals with lower recognition validities). 
Therefore, if people are sensitive to the individual validity of 
recognition, as the matching hypothesis suggests, their confi-
dence in decisions that follow the RH should correlate with 
their individual cue validities. In the absence of such a cor-
relation, however, one could conclude that people have lit-
tle metacognitive access or intuition about their recognition 
validities, which would provide further evidence against the 
matching hypothesis. In contrast, the environment adaptivity 
hypothesis implies that if people had metacognitive access 
to the validity of recognition across different domains, then 
their mean confidence ratings should also differ between 
these task domains. In the following, we tested these predic-




Ninety-nine participants (48 female; age M = 36.6 years; 
SD = 11.2; range 20–69), recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk service (Crump et al. 2013), completed this 
study via the Internet. Data were collected on a private insti-
tutional server managed by the JATOS tool (Lange, Kühn, & 
Filevich, 2015).4 Informed consent was obtained from each 
participant included in the study. All participants reported 
to be citizens and residents of the USA at the time of partici-
pation, and were informed that they could quit the study at 
any point. The study was announced to last for 30 min and 
remuneration for participation was set at 3 USD. Participants 
who did not complete the entire study were not remuner-
ated. Average completion time for the study was 28 min. 
All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.
Procedures and design
Following standard procedures in research on the RH, all 
participants completed a recognition task (Fig. 1a) and were 
asked to indicate whether they had heard or seen the name of 
a certain city before. Participants saw the name of each of 16 
cities, displayed in random sequence on the screen and indi-
cated with a key press whether they recognized it. After each 




recognition judgment, participants additionally provided rat-
ings on visual analog scales about their confidence in their 
own recognition judgment and how much further knowl-
edge they had about the given city. The recognition test also 
included one city name (Dubai) that was used as geographi-
cal reference point for the distance domain of the inference 
task; we selected this city because it was recognized by most 
participants in pilot testing and the distribution of distances 
between this and the other cities showed sufficient variabil-
ity; 100% of the participants in our main study reported to 
recognize the city of Dubai. Table 1 shows a list of all city 
names presented in this study, their corresponding criterion 
values (i.e., city populations and distances), and participants’ 
recognition rates. In a comparative judgment task (Fig. 1b) 
participants judged on each trial which one in a pair of city 
names had the higher criterion value. After each judgment, 
participants additionally indicated their confidence in their 
response to the comparative judgment on a visual analog 
scale. Each participant completed two different domains of 
the judgment task: In the population domain, participants 
Fig. 1  Tasks used in the study. Each participant completed three 
tasks. a Recognition task, in which participants reported whether they 
had heard of a given city before, how confident they were of recog-
nizing it, and how much further knowledge they had about the city. b 
Comparative judgment task, in which participants chose, for each of 
70 pairs, which of two cities was more populous (population domain) 
or closer to a geographical reference point (distance domain). Partici-
pants additionally indicated their confidence in their own responses. 
c A ranking task, in which participants sorted cities along their esti-
mated values on the criterion dimension
Table 1  Stimulus materials used in the inference task and recognition rates
a Scaled from 0 to 100
b Number of inhabitants (retrieved from http://www.wikipedia.org)
c Flying distance to Dubai in km (retrieved from http://www.distancecalculator.globefeed.com)
City name % of participants recog-
nizing the item




Population  criterionb Distance  criterionc
Istanbul 97.98 40.79 96.75 13,000,000 2994
Seoul 96.97 43.5 96.43 10,000,000 6783
Munich 95.96 41.75 96.81 1,400,000 4567
Prague 94.95 36.62 95.78 1,240,000 4446
Milan 93.94 39.77 93.72 5,200,000 4663
Cape Town 92.93 34.57 94.45 3,000,000 7642
Lima 88.89 29.63 92.15 7,500,000 14,813
Oslo 81.82 30.33 93.05 634,000 5138
Vilnius 11.11 5.86 86.03 535,000 4091
Malindi 10.1 5.06 81.68 207,000 3666
Vientiane 9.09 5.93 87.09 783,000 4934
Changsha 8.08 4.34 87.24 7,000,000 5685
Ouagadougou 5.05 4.36 86.21 1,600,000 6106
Fuyang 4.04 2.91 81.08 1,700,000 5073
Erdenet 3.03 4.73 89.93 86,000 4955
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indicated which of two cities had the larger population (70 
trials); in the distance domain, participants indicated which 
of two cities was located closer to the city of Dubai (70 tri-
als). We chose these two domains because they are expected 
to differ strongly in recognition validity (for a previous appli-
cation, see Pohl 2006) and make it possible to test people’s 
adaptivity while simultaneously holding stimulus materials 
(including recognition rates and proportion of cases where 
the RH can be applied) constant.
In a final ranking task (Fig. 1c), participants saw the list of 
preceding cities in random arrangement (displayed on inter-
active drag-and-drop HTML element) and were asked to sort 
them along to their estimated population and distance val-
ues. Each participant completed this task twice: once for the 
population-size criterion and once for the distance criterion.
The order of the recognition task and comparative judg-
ment task and the order of the population and distance 
domains were counterbalanced between subjects. Each par-
ticipant completed the comparative judgment twice, once for 
the population and once for the distance domain.5
Participants were instructed to carefully read and answer 
each question and to provide their best possible judgments. 
Moreover, participants were informed that we recorded their 
response times (RTs) and whether and when they left the 
browser window or tab during the study (e.g., by clicking 
elsewhere).
Stimulus materials
We used the most common stimulus material for investigating 
the RH, the names of real-word cities. Sixteen city names were 
selected from a larger pool. As mentioned above, one name 
(Dubai) served as geographical reference point for the distance 
domain; the remaining 15 names were used for the compara-
tive judgment task. For each participant, 70 pairs of city names 
(out of a total of 105 possible pairings) were randomly selected 
for the comparative judgment task; for a given participant, this 
same set of 70 pairs was then used in all experimental domains. 
Halfway through data collection, we mirrored the screen posi-
tion of the city names in the pairs (i.e., for half of the partici-
pants, city names displayed on the right side of the screen were 
now displayed on the left side, and vice versa).
Measurement‑modeling approach
To measure participants’ heuristic reliance on recognition, 
we used a multinomial processing tree (MPT) modeling 
approach that makes it possible to evaluate goodness-of-fit 
and to conduct model comparisons (see Batchelder & Riefer, 
1999; Erdfelder et al. 2009, for overviews). The choice of a 
recognized item in the comparative judgment task can result 
from reliance on the recognition cue, but also from guessing, 
or the use of other cues (or knowledge) that are associated 
with the criterion. In consequence, the proportion of judg-
ments in which people choose the recognized item is a con-
founded measure that can overestimate RH use (Hilbig et al. 
2010). In this study, we used the MPT r-model because it 
effectively disentangles reliance on recognition (as assumed 
by the RH) from the use of further knowledge (or any other 
strategy). Specifically, the r-model provides probability esti-
mates for the reliance on recognition (parameter r), for the 
cue validity of further knowledge, and of recognition. Fur-
ther details are in “Appendix A” (Hilbig et al. 2010; Horn 
et al. 2015, 2016; we also explored a memory-state model 
extension that did not alter the main conclusions in the pre-
sent study; see Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, Hilbig, 2014).
For our analyses, we implemented a hierarchical latent-trait 
version of the r-model (Klauer 2010; Matzke, Dolan, Batch-
elder, & Wagenmakers, 2015) that accounts for diversity in 
strategy use and that circumvents aggregation over individuals 
(see Siegler 1987, for a critical discussion of pooling over sub-
jects for investigations of strategy use). We adjusted the model 
to simultaneously account for the two within-subject condi-
tions (domains) of the study. One advantage of this approach 
is that overarching group-level distributions constrain the indi-
vidual estimates in a theoretically principled way and may 
thus yield more reliable individual parameters. Importantly, 
the latent-trait approach makes it possible to jointly estimate 
model parameters as well as their correlations. By adjusting 
for the uncertainty of the individual estimates, this approach 
promises to avoid the potential biases involved in computing 
standard Pearson correlations of individual estimates and to 
provide an assessment of these relations that is decontami-
nated from error influences (Klauer 2010).
Estimation of the model parameters relied on a Bayes-
ian approach (see Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013, for an over-
view), which has been employed in numerous areas of 
cognitive modeling (e.g., Kellen, Pachur, Hertwig, 2016; 
Nunez, Srinivasan, & Vandekerckhove, 2015; Steingroever, 
Pachur, Šmíra, & Lee, 2017; Thiele, Haaf, & Rouder, 2017). 
To determine the most credible value ranges of the model 
parameters in the posterior distributions given the data, we 
used the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology 
for posterior sampling,6 Further details of the hierarchical 
6 For MCMC sampling with JAGS (Plummer 2003), we ran three 
chains of 300,000 iterations each, discarded the first 200,000 itera-
tions as burn-in, and used a thinning rate of 10. Chain convergence 
was satisfactory for all estimated model parameters (i.e., all R̂ s < 
1.0203; Lee and Wagenmakers 2013). For all model estimates, we 
report the medians of the MCMC samples. Further details about the 
modeling approach are in the Appendices and Supplemental Materi-
als.
5 An analysis of task orders did not indicate significant sequence 




implementation and the prior distributional assumptions are 
in “Appendix B” (cf. Heck, Arnold, & Arnold, 2017; Matzke 
et al. 2015). We report posterior means with 95% Bayesian-
credible intervals. Specifically, μrPOP and μrDIS refer to the 
mean group-level estimates of reliance on recognition in the 
Population and Distance domain, respectively; moreover, we 
report the standard deviations (σrPOP, σrDIS) and the correla-
tions (ρ) among the model parameters. The standard devia-
tions represent the variability between participants and are 
close to zero when participants are homogeneous and are 
large in the case of substantial diversity.
Data quality checks
As data were collected online, we first examined indica-
tors of the quality of these data. We found no evidence that 
the data collected online were suspect of careless respond-
ing, attentional lapses, or sequence effects. However, a few 
participants left the browser tab during the experiment, as 
described below.
Focus on the task
We monitored, on each trial during the experiment, whether 
participants clicked anywhere outside the browser tab (e.g., 
potentially left the task for a short period of time). We then 
examined the frequencies of these “lost-focus events” for 
each participant and domain. Notably, participants rarely 
left the experiment tab. In the recognition task, only 6 out 
of 99 participants left the browser tab once in 16 trials, and 
no participant left the browser tab more than once. All six 
participants who left the browser tab once during the recog-
nition task also did so at least once during the comparative 
judgment task. Therefore, we focused in our data checks 
on those participants who left the browser tab during the 
comparative judgment task. During the 140 trials of the 
comparative judgment task, 50.5% of participants never left 
the browser tab, 12% left the browser tab once, 24.2% left 
the browser tab between 2 and 5 times, 8.1% left the browser 
tab between 6 and 10 times, and 5.05% left the browser tab 
more than 10 times. The maximum number of times that 
a participant left the tab was 17. A single-trial analysis 
showed that all trials in which a participant left the browser 
tab resulted in correct comparative judgments. Therefore, we 
examined whether this had an effect on accuracy in the com-
parative judgment task. We found no correlation between the 
number of times a participant left the browser tab and the 
mean accuracy (r = 0.003, p = 0.97,  BF10 = 0.21). We also 
found no conclusive evidence for an effect on accuracy in a 
comparison between participants who had left the browser 
tab at least once and participants who never did so (Welch 
test, t(96.8) = − 1.46, p = 0.14,  BF10 = 0.55). Finally, we 
conducted the analyses (that we report in the subsequent 
“Results” section) after excluding those participants (n = 49 
out of 99) who had left the browser tab at least once during 
the 140 trials of the comparative judgment task. Notably, 
we obtained largely the same results with this reduced data-
set after following this strict exclusion criterion. Because 
exclusion of participants or individual trials did not affect 
our main conclusions, we included all participants and trials 
in the subsequent analyses. We nevertheless also report the 
results of the same analyses following the cautious strategy 
of excluding participants who left the browser (at the end of 
the “Results” section).
Results
The abbreviations RR, RU+, RU−, UU refer to those trials 
in the comparative judgment task in which both city names 
were recognized (RR trials), in which only one city name 
was recognized (that was judged to have the higher criterion 
value: RU+; or not to have the higher criterion value: RU−), 
or in which both city names were unrecognized (UU trials).
Recognition rate and applicability of the RH
On average, participants recognized M = 52.92% 
(SD= 10.6%) of the 15 cities used for the comparative judg-
ment task. This resulted in a proportion of M = 51.14% cases 
(SD = 6.40%), where the RH was applicable (i.e., RU trials 
in which one of the two cities was recognized). Note that, 
recognition rate and applicability of the RH was identical 
between domains because they included the same pairs of 
city names.
Comparative judgment task
Results of the comparative judgment task are shown in 
Table 2.7 The proportion of accurate judgments was higher 
in the population than in the distance domain, t(98) = 6.09, 
p < 0.01, d = 0.61,  BF10 = 5.2 × 105. Moreover, the mean rec-
ognition validity α was higher for judgments of city popu-
lations than of distances, t(98) = 21.80, p < 0.01, d = 2.19, 
 BF10 = 1.1 × 1036; and the accordance rate to the RH was 
higher for judgments of city populations than of distances, 
t(98) = 9.85, p < 0.01, d = 0.99,  BF10 = 2.45 × 1013. The 
7 In addition to standard inferential indices and effect-size estimates, 
we report Bayes factors (BF10) to quantify the evidence for the alter-
native hypothesis relative to that for the null hypothesis. Several 
conventions exist to categorize the strength of evidence for a hypoth-
esis. Following a classification by Jeffreys (1961), BFs10 between 
1/3 and 3 indicate that the collected data are inconclusive (“anecdo-
tal”); BFs10 < 1/3 indicate moderate-to-stronger evidence for the null 




knowledge validity β was slightly lower for judgments of 
populations than of distances, t(98) = − 2.40, p < 0.05, 
d = 0.24. Together, these results suggest that the judgment 
domains differed as expected with our manipulation. These 
findings are also largely in line with a previous study that 
used similar domains (Pohl 2006). To examine whether par-
ticipants were able to adaptively adjust their reliance on the 
RH following these differences between domains, we next 
turn to the modeling results.
Formal modeling: adaptive use of recognition
Table 3 shows the posterior means of the MPT r-model 
parameters and their standard deviations and correlations. 
Because the recognition validity is crucial for determining 
the usefulness of the RH in a given domain, we examined 
how participants adapted their reliance on recognition as a 
function of cue validity. In line with the environment-adap-
tivity hypothesis, we found a clear change in people’s use of 
the RH between domains: The RH was followed more likely 
in the population than the distance domain (model parameter 
r), Δr = 0.57, 95% credibility interval: [0.44, 0.69], thereby 
following a corresponding change in the validity of recog-
nition {Δa = 0.32, [0.29, 0.34]}. Importantly, neither the 
validity of participants’ further knowledge {Δb = − 0.03, 
[−0.07, 0.01]} nor the probability of making valid inferences 
on guessing trials (UU pairs) {Δg = 0.02, [− 0.03, 0.07]} 
differed credibly between domains.
We also observed individual differences in all model 
parameters (none of the posterior intervals for the standard 
deviations in Table 3 includes zero), particularly in model 
parameter r (reliance on the recognition cue). However, does 
the variability in using the RH reflect individual differences 
in recognition validity, as the matching hypothesis sug-
gests? An examination of the latent-trait correlations within 
domains provided little support for this possibility: Neither 
within the population domain {ρrPOPaPOP = 0.38 [− 0.20, 
0.74]} nor in the distance domain {ρrDIST aDIST = − 0.06 
[− 0.48, 0.39]}, did we find credible correlations among 
model parameters r and a (recognition validity). Interest-
ingly, however, RH use was correlated across domains 
{ρrDISTrPOP = 0.38 [0.15, 0.58]}, indicating some stability in 
people’s strategy preferences above and beyond the adaptive 
changes in RH use between environments.
In sum, a clear majority of individuals (n = 87 out of 
99) adaptively changed their reliance on the RH, to vary-
ing degrees (see Fig. 2a). Notably, however, people did not 
necessarily follow their own recognition validities: their RH 
use and individual validities were uncorrelated (see Fig. 2b; 
Table 3 for correlations).
Further measures of adaptivity: confidence reports
Metacognitive sensitivity
We next examined the role of confidence and its relation 
to adaptive strategy use. To this end, we first investigated 
potential differences in metacognitive sensitivity between 
the two task domains (population, distance) with a mixed 
logistic regression that models the relation of choice con-
fidence and judgment accuracy. In this analysis, the slope 
parameter provides a measure of metacognitive sensitivity. 
The difference in slope between conditions as a function of 
confidence (i.e., the interaction term in the model), therefore, 
Table 2  Measures of the 
comparative judgment task as a 
function of domain (population 
vs. distance)
RH recognition heuristic, RU trials in the inference task in which one of the two items was recognized, RR 
trials in which both items were recognized, UU trials in which both items were unrecognized, RU+ choice 
of recognized object, RU− choice of unrecognized object, RH accordance rate proportion of RU trials in 
which the recognized item is chosen, RT response time in ms
Measure Ms SDs
Population Distance Population Distance
Proportion of accurate judgments 0.68 0.60 0.08 0.10
Choice of recognized object (RH accordance rate) 0.87 0.64 0.15 0.23
Recognition validity 0.77 0.45 0.08 . 09
Knowledge validity 0.62 0.68 0.18 0.16
RTUU 2421 3122 1645 3270
RTRU+ 2222 3453 1940 6279
RTRU− 2770 3505 3425 6091
RTRR 2504 3410 2351 4434
Confidence in comparative judgment (UU) 25.26 24.75 18.09 18.62
Confidence in comparative judgment (RU−) 32.31 33.13 21.45 19.15
Confidence in comparative judgment (RU+) 53.26 43.61 18.58 20.84
Confidence in comparative judgment (RR) 55.16 54.92 17.40 19.95
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quantifies any potential differences in metacognitive sensi-
tivity between domains. Notably, we found no significant 
interaction between confidence and domain, χ(1) = 0.16, 
p = 0.68,  BF10 = 0.01, suggesting similar metacognitive sen-
sitivity across domains. Based on this finding, we proceeded 
to compare the reported absolute confidence values between 
the two domains.
Individual confidence ratings
We compared individual confidence values across domains. 
To examine the implications of the matching hypothesis, 
we examined whether participants’ confidence tracked 
individual cue validities; that is, whether participants with 
higher α showed higher mean confidence on trials on which 
they followed the RH. To explore this possibility, we esti-
mated the correlation between α and individual mean con-
fidence on RU + trials (Fig. 3a). There was no correlation 
between α and confidence on RU + trials in the population 
domain, r = − 0.04, t(97) = − 0.44, p = 0.66,  BF10 = 0.21, or 
in the distance domain, r = − 0.08, t(97) = − 0.83, p = 0.40, 
 BF10 = 0.23. People may have systematic over- or under-con-
fidence tendencies (e.g., Fischoff, 1982). Such tendencies, 
if present in our data, could introduce additional variance 
into confidence reports, thereby masking significant rela-
tions between α and mean confidence on RU + trials. To con-
trol for such tendencies, we also examined the correlation 
between intra-individual changes between domains in confi-
dence and in corresponding α (Fig. 3b). Again, there was no 
evidence for a correlation between changes in α and in con-
fidence between the two domains, r = − 0.12, t(97) = − 1.18, 
p = 0.24,  BF10 = 0.12.
Mean confidence ratings
Finally, we examined mean confidence ratings across 
domains and trial types to evaluate the impact of task 
environment. Figure 3c shows confidence ratings for all 
trial types (RR, RU+, RU−, UU trials) as a function of 
domain (see also Table 3 for the means). We analysed 
these data in a 4 (trial type) × 2 (domain) ANOVA.8 First, 
there was a significant interaction between the trial types 
and domain on the confidence reports, F(3,216) = 8.521, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 Because some participants did not contribute any RU − trials 
(mainly in the population domain), this analysis excluded 26 partici-
pants with missing values in at least one cell. As an alternative analy-
sis, in a 3 (trial type: RU, UU, RR) × 2 (domain) ANOVA, where tri-
als were collapsed across RU + and RU − trials (and only one subjects’ 
data had to be discarded), we observed an interaction between trial 
type and domain, F(2,194) = 17.64, p < .001, η2 = 15), a main effect of 
trial type F(2,194) = 226.5, p < .001, η2 = 0.70, and a main effect of 
domain F(1,97) = 9.215, p = .003, η2 = 08.
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on people’s confidence reports differed across the specific 
trial types in the comparative judgment task. Follow-up t 
tests revealed no differences in mean confidence on RR, 
UU, or RU − trial types between the population and the 
distance domains: all ts < 1.24, all  BFs10 < 0.26. Notably, 
however, confidence ratings for RU + trials were signifi-
cantly higher in the population than the distance domain 
(difference M = 7.68, SD  = 14.97), t(72) = 4.38, p < 0.001, 
d = 0.51,  BF10 = 490. That is, confidence differences 
between domains emerged mainly on those judgment tri-
als where the recognized object was chosen and the RH 
was applicable (RU + trials). Moreover, there was a signifi-
cant main effect of trial type, F(3,216) = 140.2, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.661. The main effect of domain F(1,72) = 1.933, 
p = 0.169, η2 = 0.026 did not reach significance.
In sum, while participants did not show differences in 
metacognitive sensitivity between domains, we found dif-
ferences in their (absolute) confidence ratings between 
domains, specifically on RU + trials. This suggests that rec-
ognition-validity differences between domains were avail-
able to metacognitive monitoring, even though differences 
in valid further knowledge and in criterion knowledge were 
negligible across these domains.
Criterion knowledge
We used participants’ responses in the ranking task to esti-
mate their criterion knowledge. For this purpose, we cal-
culated the Spearman’s rank correlation for each domain 
between each participant’s ranking and the correct ranking 
of cities (for further discussion of the role of linear orders 
in inference, see, e.g., Schweickart & Brown, 2014, and 
Brown & Tan 2011). We then performed non-parametric 
tests on the individual rank-correlation values. We con-
ducted two variants of this analysis. First, we restricted 
analysis to the cities recognized by each participant because 
it could be argued that criterion knowledge can only be 
meaningfully applied to cities that are recognized. How-
ever, Pohl and Hilbig (2012) suggested that unrecognized 
items might also be ordered. Therefore, we also repeated 
these analyses, including all city names. For recognized 
cities only, we found no differences in criterion knowledge 
Fig. 2  Adaptivity in recogni-
tion use at the individual level. 
a Change score of recognition 
use for each participant (dif-
ference in parameter r between 
domains, Δr = rPOPULATION − 
rDISTANCE). A clear majority of 
participants uses the RH more 
likely when recognition validity 
is higher (in the population 
domain) but the magnitudes of 
this change are highly variable. 
b Model parameter r (reliance 
on recognition) plotted against 
the individual recognition 




between the population (M = 0.38, SD = 0.35) and the dis-
tance (M = 0.40, SD  =  0.41) domains (asymptotic one-
sample permutation test: T = 19.82, p = 0.80;  BF10 = 0.11). 
The similar levels of criterion knowledge in participants’ 
rankings suggest that the task difficulty was comparable 
across domains. However, including the unrecognized cities 
in the analysis revealed a significant difference in criterion 
knowledge between the population (M = 0.51, SD  =  0.17) 
and distance (M = 0.20, SD   = 0.31) domains (asymp-
totic one-sample permutation test: T = 33.4, p < 0.001, 
Fig. 3  Confidence in the comparative judgments. a Mean individ-
ual confidence reports plotted against recognition validity α in each 
domain. b Difference in mean individual confidence between popula-
tion and distance domains (for RU + trials, where the recognized city 
name is chosen) plotted against corresponding differences in α. c Dis-
tributions and group means (horizontal bars) of confidence reports as 
a function of trial type and domain (population, distance)
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 BF10 = 1.17 × 1011). These findings could suggest that for 
unrecognized city names (e.g., Fuyang), features such as 
their spelling or sound may nonetheless help people to make 
judgments of criterion values and that such features might 
be more helpful for judgments of the population than of the 
distance criterion.
Supplemental analyses with exclusion 
of participants
We also repeated our analyses with a restricted sample of 
N = 50 participants who never left the browser tab dur-
ing the experiment. This largely reproduced the results 
reported above: That is, there were again expected differ-
ences between the two domains in recognition validity α, 
t(49) = 16.28, p < 0.001, d = 2.30,  BF10 = 2.09 × 1018, and in 
the reliance on recognition (r model parameter), t(49) = 5.70, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.81,  BF10 = 2.3 × 105.
Concerning confidence reports, the linear model again 
revealed no interaction effect, suggesting that meta-
cognitive sensitivity did not differ between domains 
[χ2(1) = 2.03, p = 0.15,  BF10 = 0.05]. Moreover, we found 
no correlations between α and mean confidence for either 
the population domain [t(48) = − 0.33, p = 0.74, r = − 0.05, 
 BF10 = 0.37], the distance domain [t(48) = − 1.44, p = 0.16, 
r = − 0.20,  BF10 = 0.51] or the change scores between the 
two [t(48) = − 0.24, p = 0.81, r = − 0.04,  BF10 = 0.12]. The 
4 (trial type) × 2 (domain) ANOVA on mean confidence 
ratings showed no significant interaction F(3,99) = 1.27, 
p = 0.29, η2 = 0.04. We nevertheless explored domain 
differences in follow-up t tests and again found that the 
confidence differences between domains on RU + trials 
remained [t(33) = 3.05, p = 0.004, d = 0.52,  BF10 = 8.66] 
whereas there were again no significant confidence dif-
ferences between domains on RR or RU − trial types 
(ts < 1.01;  BFs10 < 0.29). Unlike the results with the full 
dataset, however, the confidence difference between 
domains in UU trials reached significance [t(33) = 2.13, 
p = 0.04, d = 0.37,  BF10 = 1.36].
Finally, there were again no differences in criterion 
knowledge between domains (asymptotic one-sample 
permutation test T = 231, p = 0.10,  BF10 = 0.16) when we 
included only the recognized cities. And, again, the same 
analysis including all cities indicated higher criterion knowl-
edge for the population domain than the distance domain 
(T = 741, p < 0.001,  BF10 = 8.67 × 105). Taken together, the 
re-analyses with a restricted sample of participants largely 
confirmed the main conclusions reported for the whole 
sample.
Discussion
In this study, participants made comparative judgments 
on a criterion dimension in two different task domains: In 
a population domain, where following recognition cues 
leads to relatively accurate judgments and in a distance 
domain, where this is unlikely. We observed that a clear 
majority of participants adaptively adjusted their reliance 
on recognition (albeit to highly varying degrees) and uti-
lized recognition less frequently in a domain with lower 
recognition validity. We extended previous research by 
showing that this adaptive change occurs within individu-
als. This finding fills an important gap in the literature 
and could only be presumed so far on the basis of com-
parisons across group averages or across studies. Notably, 
one recent study found that individual differences in heu-
ristic use of recognition are relatively stable across time, 
choice objects (different samples of city names), domains 
(success of celebrities vs. success of films), and presenta-
tion formats (verbal vs. pictorial), suggesting that people 
could have trait-like strategy preferences (Michalkiewicz 
& Erdfelder, 2016). The present findings are consistent 
with these reports, but highlight the complementary aspect 
of situation-specific, adaptive behavior. That is, we found 
that even under situations that differed substantially in 
recognition-cue validity, participants showed moderate 
stability in their reliance on recognition (as indicated by 
the positive correlation between the r parameters across 
the two different domains); importantly, above and beyond 
this stability, people showed flexible and adaptive behavior 
and substantially reduced their use of recognition in a situ-
ation where this was less useful.
It is an ongoing research issue to identify the processes 
leading to adaptive strategy selection. That is, why do partic-
ipants utilize recognition more in contexts where it is more 
valid and how do they notice (i.e., on the basis of which 
information) when recognition cues are more valid? Based 
on previous theorizing, we reconsidered two possibilities in 
our within-subjects design: the matching hypothesis, which 
suggests that people are sensitive to their individual recogni-
tion validities; and the environment adaptivity hypothesis, 
which instead suggests that participants are only sensitive to 
more global differences between domains (e.g., Pachur et al. 
2009; Pohl et al., 2017).
To test the matching hypothesis, we examined the covari-
ation between individual RH use and recognition validities 
with a hierarchical multinomial model. The approach prom-
ised to sidestep possible biases involved in multi-step cor-
relational analyses (Klauer 2010). We replicated previous 
Psychological Research 
1 3
findings and found no relationship between participants’ 
recognition use and the individual cue validities within the 
two domains (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pohl 2006). Nota-
bly, and in extension of these findings, we also observed no 
relationship between individual changes in recognition use 
and corresponding cue validities across domains. Nonethe-
less, experience and frequent exposure to media could help 
people to develop intuitions about the usefulness of recog-
nition. Hence, while direct access to the exact individual 
recognition validities appears unlikely, it is still possible that 
participants are somewhat sensitive to cue validities on a 
metacognitive level. Following this idea, we examined par-
ticipants’ comparative judgments as well as their confidence 
in these judgments on each trial (reported on a visual ana-
logue scale). The aim was to explore whether participants 
had some metacognitive intuition about their individual cue 
validities. We reasoned that if participants had metacogni-
tive access to recognition validity, this would particularly 
influence their confidence on those trials where the recog-
nized object was chosen. However, individual recognition 
validities were not associated with individual confidence rat-
ings. Taken together, we found little evidence—both at the 
cognitive and metacognitive level—that participants’ judg-
ments are guided by individual recognition-cue validities.
Participants showed adaptive and large changes in their 
reliance on recognition between the different task domains. 
Therefore, participants may have based their strategy use 
on more global factors, as the environment adaptivity 
hypothesis suggests. In this vein, we also examined changes 
in confidence between the domains. Confidence reports 
can be interpreted as a function of two separable factors: 
the strength of a monitored signal and a subjective crite-
rion that determines the confidence level (Fleming & Lau, 
2014). Hence, differences in confidence reports between 
domains could reflect differences in metacognitive sensi-
tivity between domains (e.g., leading participants to inac-
curately assign high confidence to erroneous judgments in 
one domain more frequently than in the other). Differences 
in confidence reports between domains could also reflect 
differences in the strength of the internal signal. The present 
findings suggest the latter, but provide no evidence for the 
former: We found no differences in metacognitive sensitivity 
between domains; differences in criterion knowledge or fur-
ther knowledge were also subtle between domains. Nonethe-
less, we found clear differences in participants’ confidence 
ratings as function of domain as well as trial type.
Notably, the mean confidence ratings for judgments on 
RU + pairs and on RR pairs were similar in the population 
domain, but not in the distance domain. That is, when par-
ticipants chose a recognized item in a domain with high 
recognition validity, even a lack of knowledge (only one 
name recognized) led to similarly high confidence as when 
both names were recognized. In other words, not recogniz-
ing a name contributed more to people’s confidence in the 
population than the distance domain. Moreover, in line with 
the notion that confidence is influenced by the most valid 
available cue (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1991), it is possible that 
participants’ confidence ratings on RU + trials were higher 
in the population than in the distance domain because the 
validity of recognition (α = 0.77) in the former was higher 
than the validity of further available knowledge (β = 0.68) in 
the latter. Overall, these findings are in line with the predic-
tions of an extended environment adaptivity hypothesis and 
suggest that participants are also sensitive on a metacogni-
tive level in which domain name recognition is more or less 
helpful.
Limitations
Other perspectives and modeling approaches have been 
advocated to explain adaptive changes in judgment behav-
ior. In network modeling, for instance, adaptivity has been 
conceptualized as a gradual change in the relative weight of 
various cues that are utilized for judgment (e.g., Glöckner 
et al. 2014) and not as a qualitative shift in strategy use (i.e., 
a shift in using the RH). Hence, the model parameter r in 
the present analyses could be alternatively interpreted as the 
degree of reliance on recognition, relative to other cues or 
information (see Heck & Erdfelder, 2017, for a discussion). 
Nonetheless, the present domain manipulations are informa-
tive from both modeling perspectives and provide a testbed 
for adaptive changes in judgment behavior. Moreover, the 
notion of qualitative strategy use (as assumed in the adaptive 
toolbox perspective) and of single-process mechanisms (e.g., 
in network modeling) is not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
For example, frugal lexicographic strategies have been fruit-
fully implemented as network models, too (Mata 2005). The 
different (modeling) perspectives on adaptivity discussed in 
the literature could mainly highlight different levels of analy-
sis (Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012).
Another potential limitation of the current study is that 
the data were collected online through the Mechanical Turk 
platform. In line with previous research that suggests com-
patibility between experimental online and laboratory stud-
ies (e.g., Crump et al. 2013), our results largely corroborated 
findings from a rich body of laboratory research on the RH 
(e.g., Hilbig et al. 2015; Marewski et al. 2010; Pohl 2006). 
However, some participants might have completed the cur-
rent tasks in environments that were noisier than in typical 
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laboratory settings. Approximately, 50% of the participants 
left the browser tab at least once during the task and might 
have searched for relevant information. This raises the issue 
of whether a city can still be considered as unrecognized 
if a participant read about it or whether a few participants 
have obtained some criterion knowledge during the experi-
ment. Our data cannot fully exclude these possibilities, as 
we could not monitor or restrict what participants did out-
side the experimental task. However, we examined whether 
leaving the task had significant impact on accuracy, strategy 
use, or confidence ratings, and found little evidence for these 
possibilities. Moreover, we examined participants’ response 
times on individual trials, study duration times, and con-
sistency between responses in different parts of the tasks, 
again providing little evidence that participants responded 
carelessly or that potential distractions had notable effects 
on our main conclusions.
Nonetheless, a potential avenue for future research could 
be a laboratory-based replication of the current findings.
Conclusion
This study investigated within-person adaptivity in the fru-
gal use of recognition for judgment. A clear majority of 
participants adaptively adjusted their strategy use between 
domains of different recognition cue validity. In line with 
previous studies that examined adaptivity between subjects, 
the use of recognition did not follow individual cue validi-
ties. Confidence reports suggested that participants assigned 
higher confidence to recognition in the domain with the 
higher recognition validity. Notably, this result could not 
be explained by differences between domains in people’s 
metacognitive sensitivity, in their criterion knowledge, or in 
their valid further knowledge, but instead suggests that peo-
ple have good intuitions about global differences between 
judgment domains.
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Appendix A
Description of the multinomial processing tree 
model
Multinomial processing tree (MPT) models (see Batchelder 
& Riefer, 1999, and Erdfelder et al. 2009, for reviews) treat 
categorical response frequencies as probabilistic realizations 
of underlying cognitive states that are represented by model 
parameters. The MPT r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 
2010), used in the present analyses, can be illustrated in form 
of a tree diagram (Fig. 4).
The model accounts for three possible cases (trial types) 
in a comparative judgment task (i.e., RR, RU, and UU cases), 
represented by J = 3 separate trees. In each of the model 
trees, possible responses are assigned to one of the K mutu-
ally exclusive outcome categories Cjk, distinguishing between 
inference accuracy (correct vs. false) and choice of recog-
nized (+) versus unrecognized (−) items. In the context of 
the present analyses, the upper tree refers to the case where 
both city names are recognized (RR case), and therefore, fur-
ther information (beyond mere name recognition) comes into 
play, leading to a correct inference with probability b and to 
an incorrect inference with complementary probability 1 − b. 
Parameter b thus indexes the validity of further information 
(beyond recognition) in conceptual equivalence to knowledge 
validity β. The second tree represents the case where only one 
of the two city names is recognized (RU case) and the RH can, 
therefore, be applied. With probability r, the decision-maker 
uses recognition as a cue and chooses the recognized name. 
This leads to a correct inference with probability a and to an 
incorrect inference with probability 1 − a. Parameter a meas-
ures the association between recognition and the criterion vari-
able, in equivalence to the recognition validity α (Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002). With complementary probability 1 − r, 
the inference is based on further information beyond recog-
nition (or any other strategy). This leads to a correct infer-
ence with probability b. The recognized object is then chosen 
with probability a and the unrecognized object is chosen with 
probability 1 − a. With probability 1 − b, the inference is incor-
rect. The unrecognized item is then chosen with probability a 
and the recognized item is chosen with probability 1 − a. In 
the bottom tree, neither city is recognized (UU case) and the 
decision-maker makes a correct inference with probability g 
(e.g., by making a guess). We employed a hierarchical Bayes-
ian implementation of the r-model that accounts for individual 
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variability and covariances among parameters. Further details 
are in “Appendix B”.
Appendix B
Graphical model of the hierarchical Bayesian 
implementation
The individual-level parameters πi = (bi, gi, ai, ri) are mod-
eled (in probit-transformed space) as πi ← Φ (μπ + ξπ·δiπ) 
and hence represent linear combinations of a group-level 
mean μπ ~ N(0,1), a multiplicative scaling parameter, 
ξπ ~ U(0,10), and an individual displacement parameter 
δiπ that is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution 
with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix Σ− 1 ~ Wishart 
(I, 5) prior distribution (Fig. 5). For the present purposes, 
we adapted the modeling code as described in Lee and 
Wagenmakers (2013) and in Matzke et al. (2015). In addi-
tion, we verified our results with the TreeBugs package for 
R by Heck, Arnold, and Arnold 2017.
Appendix C
Logistic mixed model analysis
We used mixed logistic regression models to quantify 
metacognitive sensitivity by comparing judgment accu-
racy for high-confidence trials vs. that for low-confidence 
trials. This method accounts for differences in confidence 
biases between participants (Rausch, Müller, & Zehetleit-
ner, 2015; Wierzchoń, Asanowicz, Paulewicz, & Cleere-
mans, 2012). Logistic regression models describe the rela-
tionship between a binary outcome variable (in our case, 
response accuracy in the comparative judgment task) and 
several predictors (reported confidence). With mixed mod-
els, it is possible to directly analyze individual (and not 
the pooled) trials, while taking into account that multiple 
trials correspond to a single participant by assigning a dif-
ferent intercept and/or slope to each individual. Logistic 
regression models assume a linear relationship between 
the logarithm of the odds of the two possible outcomes 
and the modeled predictors (i.e., confidence) which is 
not always satisfied. For this reason, Rausch et al. recom-
mended the use of other measures of metacognitive (“type 
Fig. 4  Illustration of the MPT 
r-model with parameters b 
(validity of further knowledge), 
g (probability of a correct 
guess), r (probability of reliance 




2”) sensitivity, such as meta-d (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
These measures, however, rely on further assumptions 
of signal-detection theory (SDT). While there is ample 
evidence that well-controlled visual stimuli can be suc-
cessfully modeled with SDT, this may not be warranted 
for comparative judgments, as in the present study. There-
fore, we followed Siedlecka, Paulewicz, and Wierzchoń 
(2016) and operationalized metacognitive sensitivity as 
the slope of the mixed logistic regression model with judg-
ment accuracy as the dependent variable and confidence 
as the predictor. We specified the model, including task 
domain (distance or population) and confidence, together 
with their interaction, as fixed effects. We also included 
individual city pairs (regardless of the presented order) 
and participant as random intercepts, and a random slope 
for the effect of confidence, thereby accounting for differ-
ences in metacognitive sensitivity between participants. 
We scaled and centered confidence as the only numerical 
predictor. We specified the models using the lme4 pack-
age for R (version 3.3.0) and report the p values from a 
likelihood-ratio test.
Fig. 5  The graph structure illustrates a hierarchical latent-trait version 
(see Klauer 2010, and; Matzke et al. 2015, for further details) of the 
multinomial r-model, which is described in “Appendix A”. A model 
for one measurement domain is shown. Displayed are dependencies 
(i.e., probabilistic and deterministic relations) among latent model 
parameters and the data. Following conventional notation, observed 
variables are symbolized by shaded nodes, latent variables by 
unshaded nodes, continuous variables by circular nodes, and discrete 
variables by square nodes (Lee and Wagenmakers 2013). The plates 
indicate replications over the J = 3 different model trees (i.e., the three 
different trial types in the comparative judgment task: RR, RU, and 
UU cases) and over I individuals. For each individual i, the response 
data xij (a vector with a participant’s category counts in a tree) follow 
a multinomial distribution with category probabilities 휣ij and number 
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